THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN INTER-REGIONAL MIGRATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF MANCHURIA, 1668-1911

CHAO CHUNG-FU

I. NORTH CHINESE MIGRATION INTO MANCHURIA, 1668-1900

The North Chinese migrants' opening up Manchuria to agricultural development is one of the miracles of the great migrations of modern times. During the century and a half from the beginning of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century the number of people who migrated to the United States from all over the world numbered 40 million.(1) During the same time period about 20 million people moved from China Proper into Manchuria, transforming its vast unpopulated stretches into a modernized and productive agricultural economy. By 1930 the "national wealth" of Manchuria amounted to 8,031,052,000 *yuan* (computed in Chinese silver dollars of that time); about 80% of that amount or 6,123,137,000 *yuan* may be accounted for by agricultural items.(2) Since Manchuria before the migration was largely unpopulated, the North Chinese migration may truly be said to have built modern agrarian Manchuria, and this modern agriculturally developed Manchuria in turn supplied the infrastructure for industrialization.

For most of the time before the late Ch'ing, Manchuria was allegedly closed to Chinese migration. Before the Ch'ing the Ming government established military settlements in the Liao River basin and on the Liao-tung peninsula, but most of the other areas of Manchuria were untouched.(3) The Ch'ing conquest did not immediately change the situation. In 1653 the Ch'ing government promulgated an "Order to Recruit Agricultural Settlers" in Southern Manchuria (*Liao-tung Chao K'en ling* 遼東招墾令),(4) but this was

(1) Benjamin Nunn Zeigler (ed.), Immigration, An American Dilemma (Boston, 1953), p. 17
(2) Manshukoku kokumin shototu narabi ni kokufu keisansho showa gonen (Eatimates of the national income and national wealth of Manchukuo in 1930) (Dairen, 1933). See Kungtu C. Sun et. al., The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (Harvard Univ. Press, 1969), P. 39
(3) Chao Chung-fu, "Chin-tai tung-san-sheng i-min wen-ti te yen-chiu (Migration into Manchuria in the Late Ch'ing and Early Republican Period), *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, vol. 4, no. 2 pp. 613-664
(4) Sheng-chin tung-chih (Gazetteer of Sheng-chin Territory) (1735 ed.), vol. 19, Passim
(5) Ibid.

abolished only fifteen years later in 1668.(5) From that moment, Manchuria entered a two-century long restriction, during which time the population remained relatively sparse and scattered except in the south where agricultural growth, developing from the old military colonies, continued apace.

Yet the two centuries of restriction witnessed a continuous migrition of North Chinese farmers into Manchuria. In 1685 the Chinese population (computed in terms of male head of housholds) was 26,227, and the amount of land owned by Chinese amounted to 312,859 *mou*. By 1890 the entire Chinese population was 5,046,000 and there were 30,075,400 *mou* owned by Chinese.(6) In 1653 there were only one civil government prefecture and three civil districts (*hsien*); by 1907, after Mancimra had officially been transformed into the three provinces of Feng-t'ien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang, there were as many as 90 subordinate civil administrative districts (prefectures, *fu*, departments, *chou*, districts, *hsien*, and sub-prefectures, *t'ing*).(7) This increase in local civil govern-ment administrative units reflected an increase in population and an expansion of the territory occupied by the agricultural settlers from North China.(8)

Table One

Chinese Population and Land Ownership in Manchuria in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenjh Centuries (9)

Date	Chinese Population	Date	Land Ownership (in mou)
1685(a)	157,362	1683(g)	312,859
1724(b)	252,000	1724(h)	600,000

(6) See Table I. Multiplying the 1635 population figure by 6, to obtain 157, 363, the number of Chinese family members, will give a figure more readily compared with the 1890 population statistics.

(7) Chao Cheng-chuan, Ch'ing-tai ti-li yen-ke-piao (A Chart of Political Geography of the Ch'ing Dynasty) (Shanghai, 1949), pp. 15-41

(8) During the period of restriction, Manchuria was chiefly governed by a Manchu military governor stationed in Sheng-ching or Fengt'ien (also known as Mukden). But the Manchu garrison existed to deal with Manchus; a local civil administration was expected to deal with the local Chinese. The highest authority in this hierarchy was the independent Prefect (Fu-yin府尹) or mayor of Fengt'ien who in 1884 began to act as Governor (Hsun-fu巡撫).

(9) Sources: for *a*, *b*, *c*, See Wen-hsien tung-kao (A Study of Cultural Heritage) vol. 19 "Population"; for *d*, see Wang Shih-ta, "An Estimate of Chinese Populaton in Modern Period", *Social Science Journal*, vol. 1, No. 4; for *e* see Chin-tai chung-kuo nung-yeh tsu-liao hsun-chi (Collected Materials on Modern Chinese Agicultural Economy), vol. 1, Table 5, p. 11; for *f* ibid. p. 17; for *g* see Kang-hsi and Yung-cheng shih-lu (Veritable Records of the Kang-hsi and Yung-cheng Periods), Passim; for *h* see Ishida kohei, Manshu ni okesu shokuminch keizai no shiteki tenkai (History of Development of the Colonial Economy in Manchuria) (Tokyo, 1965), p. 43 Table 1-2; for *i* see Kang-hsi and Yung-cheng shih-lu, Passim; for i see Ta-ch'ing hui-tien (The Ch'ing Institutions), "Chia-ch'ing's Reign, vol. 11, pp. 10-13; for *k* see kotake fumio, kinsei shina keizaishi keykyu (Research in the Economic History of Modern China) (Tokyo, 1942), p. 219; for *l* see Ta-ch'ing hui-tien, "Kwang-hsu's Reign," vol. 17-pp. 184-185

1749(c)	406,500	1734(i)	2,622,722
1842(d)	1,665,542	1812(j)	22,854,600
1872(e)	3,318,000	1872(k)	13,000,000
1890(f)	5,046,000	1887(l)	30,075,400

The tremendous increase in the Chinese population of Manchurin is evident in Table One. From 1668, after the Ching government abolished the active recruitment of settlers, agricultural settlers nevertheless continuously infiltrated the territory to engage in farming, the movement being intensified in decade of the 1890's. During this period the Ch'ing prohibition, if so called, on migration certain areas of Manchuria was never lifted. Why, then, did the Chinese migrants continue to stream in to Manchuria? What was the nature and efficacy of the migration prohibition, and why did the Ch'ing government fail to back up its prohibition with a stringent prevention of further immigration after 1668?

THE NATURE OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CHINESE MIGRANTS

The fact was that the Ch'ing decision of 1668 was not a prohibition but a halting of its recruitment policy. During the next two centuries, however, Chinese kept moving into Manchuria on their own. There they were permitted to follow their agricultural pursuits but only under terms set by the Ch'ing court. These terms favored not the new Chinese immigrants but the Manchu Bannermen alreany resident in Manchuria. The Ch'ing policy was not one of Manchuria for Manchus but rather Manchuria for Manchus but with Chinese assistance. The dominant Manchu cultural and economic position in Manchuria was to be preserved, the economic wealth derived from such products as ginseng and pearls was to be extracted for the enhancement of the imperial accounts, and Manchu Bannermen living in or transplanted to Manchuria were to be favored with access to the best land on better terms than given to the Chinese.[10] If, under these conditions Chinese settlers wished to enter Manchuria, they could do so. Thus, the so-called prohibition on Chinese migration into Manchuria consisted not so much of an outright prohibition as a set of restrictive terms for land ownership, tax and rent payments, and the like. These should have daunted the settlers but in fact they did not. Chinese continued to stream into Manchuria, particularly settling in the south.

(10) Hsiao I-shan, "Ch'ing-tai tung-pei chih tun-ken yu i-min" (Migration and Asticultural Settlement of Manchuria during the Ch'ing Period), *Hsueh-shu chi-ken* (Academy Quarterly), vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 1-5

Why has the Ch'ing policy been known to historians as a policy of immigration prohibition (*Feng-chin* 封禁)? It is true that the Ch'ien-lung Emperor (reg. 1736-1795) issued a number of edicts prohibiting Chinese from going into Manchuria either by land or sea, as well as interdicting the private and therefore illegal cultivation of land in Manchuria.(11) But these edicts were applied with varying force at different times and in different places. The Ch'ien-lung Emperor's edicts do not reflect a hard fixed policy of prohibition. But the edicts of prohibition at the same time may well have gone unenforced because continued migration from north China into Manchuria served to relieve population pressures in north China. In 1771 the entire population of China was 240,000,000 and the population density was 19 persons per square kilometer. At the same time, north China, that is the provinces of Chihli, Shantung, and Honan, possessed a combined population of 59,000,000, with a density of 129 per square kilometer. The Chinese population of Manchuria in 1771 was 830,000 with a density of 0.7 per square Kilometer. Even by 1900 Manchuria's population was 8,000,000 but the population density had risen to only 7 per square Kilometer.(12) It is clear thet north China was a rather heavily populated area of China and Manchuria the underpopulated one. The two adjacent areas had a natural attraction for each other and could complement each other nicely. Manchuria was the logical focal point of any migration out of north China, and migration out of north China was a necessity.

The so-called policy of prohibition, then, is more a myth than an historical fact simply because that there was no way to have a total ban on Chinese migration to Manchuria if Manchuria was to be opened. Members of the Banner population were not practiced in the arts of agriculture; they did not possess the traditions of experience in the fields and with the climate that the farmers of North China brought with them. Furthermore, when the Ch'ing court attempted to improve the condition of the impoverished Bannermen residing near Peking by transplanting them to Manchuria, the policy failed, and many of the transplanted Manchu settlers sneaked back to the capital area to continue their lives of poverty and indolence abeded by government subsidies, lives which they apparently preferred to the back breaking labor of farm work in

(11) Ch'ien-lung shih-lu (Veritable Rerords of the Ch'ien-lung Period), Passim

(12) Wu hsi-yung, Chin-tai tung-pei i-min shih-lueh (A Brief History of Migration into Manchuriain in Modern Times), *Tung-pei chi-kan* (Northeast Quarterly), vol. 2, pp. 1-63

Manchuria.[13] But the seasoned hardened farmers from the North China plain were able to adapt Manchuria with relative ease. They filled the breach left by the departing transplanted capital area Bannermen and began to farm Banner lands. As a result, the Ch'ing policy of transplanting capital area Bannermen to farm in Manchuria became, inadvertently, a policy of providing both farm land and jobs for the North Chinese migrants.

The Ch'ing policy left the way open for opportunities for Chinese in Manchuria, but these opportunities were accompanied by restrictions. For instance, Chinese access to farmland of their own was greatly hampered by the fact that all land transactions in either direction between Chinese and Manchus were expressly prohibited (*Ch'i-min pu-chiao ch'an* 旗民不交產). But to compensate, the Ch'ing government occasionally made outright grants of certain land to the migrant Chinese. Thus, the new settlers did obtain access to land. In fact, their influx and activities even under restrictive terms came to jeopardize the Bannermen's dominant landholding position in Manchuria. As a result, in 1728 the Ch'ing court undertook a thorough cadastral survey of all of southern Manchuria to identify Manchu and Chinese land ownership in the area.[14] All the information was based on examination of original deeds and compiled into a series known as the Red "Registers" (*Hung-ts'e* 紅册). Of course, examination of original deeds revealed discrepancies in the legal and actual status of certain Chinese lands. The cadastral survey resulted in incensed partiality to Manchus as Chinese illegal squatting was revealed and ended.

Another Ch'ing restriction on Chinese agricultural enterprise in Manchuria lay in taxation policy. According to old practice, the Manchu Bannermen paid rent, the Chinese paid taxes (*Ch'i-jen natsu, Min-jen nafu* 旗人納租，民人納賦).[15] In the late eighteenth century the average Chinese land tax payment averaged to .025 taels on each *mou*, but a Chinese rent paid on Banner land yielded double that amount for the government.[16] Moreover, the Chinese rent was generally higher than the Bannermen's low rent of "A bundle of reeds and a pint of beans" (*ts'ao i-shu, tou i-shen* 草一束，豆一升) per six *mou*, as

(13) Ch'ien-lung shih-lu, vol. 115, pp. 18-23; vol. 127, pp. 23-24
(14) Hui-tien shih-li (Precedents of Ch'ing Statutes), vol. 172
(15) Kantoshu tochi kyukan ippan (A General Survey of the Old Land Tenure System in Southern Feng-tien) (Dairen, 1915), p. 194
(16) Ibid., pp. 194-199

fixed in 1693.(17) If Chinese settlers were permitted to work but not purchase Banner lands, not only did this not violate the prohibition on land transactions between Manchus and Chinese, but also the government revenues would be enhanced. Thus the Ch'ing law which had been initiated to discriminate against Chinese and favor Manchus in the matter of both land ownership and tax payments, ended by tolerating Chinese movement onto Banner lands, because this yielded a higher income for the government. By the late eighteenth century such additional revenues were prized because the Ch'ing court was suffering from the financial extravagances of the Ch'ien-lung reign. The combination of sparse Banner population in Manchuria and the low rents generated by Banner farming of Banner lands caused the government to appreciate what the Chinese immigrant settlers could do for the imperial revenue. Thus the figures in Table One are misleading. Table One shows only the increase in Chinese land ownership; what it fails to reveal is the much larger increase in Chinese farming of Banner lands. After the cadastral survey, the Chinese population of Manchuria continued to increase, but between 1734 and 1872 Chinese land ownership in no way kept pace with Chinese population growth in Manchuria. Although figures are not available to cover exactly comparable periods and areas, it may be said that roughly in this period there was an eight-fold increase in population and a five-fold increase in land ownership in Manchuria by Chinese. (See Table One.) Thus, a significant number of Chinese were pushed onto Banner lands to farm them in the status of sublessees or even as hired labor.(18)

At this point it will be useful to review exactly what types of Manchurian lands, in addition to their own, the Chinese working. Basically these were of three chief types:

(1) Imperial lands (*kuan-ti* 官地)
These included leased farmsteads, imperial pastures, and land turned over to the Banners.

(2) Banner lands (*ch'i-ti* 旗地)
These included enclosed lands which had been bestowed on Banner groups after the conquest (known as *chuan-ti* 圈地) and land privately owned by Bannermen (*ch'i-hung-ts'e-ti* 旗紅册地), literally Banner lands noted in the Red Registers.

(17) Ibid., pp. 128-130
(18) Kirin tung-chih (Gazetteer of the Kirin Territory) (1891 ed.). vol. 30-31a, b

(3) Lands held in common by family groups, schools, or other associations (*kung-ti* 公地).[19]

The status of Chinese farmers on these lands varied. In some cases they were sublessees and paid rents directly to the Ch'ing authorities. In other cases they stepped in and held the mortgages on Banner lands and paid rents in place of the owners. The lowest status available for them was that of hired laborer on Banner lands; this status was also resorted to by many. In the interests of increased revenues which it was realized the Manchu Bannermen could not supply, it is reasonable to assume that the Ch'ing governmet tends to accept the reality.

After 1860 the situation in Manchuria changed drastically because of the Russian threat. What had been a Ch'ing policy of not interfering with Chinese migration and farming now became a policy of strengthening border defenses against further foreign depradations by moving people, particularly the eager Chinese, into the border areas. The events that produced these results were chiefly the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and peking (1860) by which Russia received about one third of old Manchuria (all the territory north of the Amur River plus the area east of the Ussuri), as well as the opening of Newchwang as a Treaty Port by the Treaty of Tientsin (1858).[20] Now instead of the former benign neglect of both the Chinese migrants and the Manchurian frontier areas, both these became the focus of Ch'ing promotional efforts.

In 1860 the Ch'ing court approved the opening of two pieces of waste land in Kirin and Heilungkiang. The unusual feature of this new land opening, however, was that on this occasion the land made available to both Bannermen and Chinese. By the 1860 policy certain Chinese migrants received their own lands, in Kirin and Heilungkiang, for ownership from the government on easy terms.[21]

The new policy was nevertheless in some aspects still couched in the old terms of discrimination in favor of Bannermen, only this time the favored Bannermen were not transplants from the capital area but from Southern Manchuria.

---

(19) Kantoshu tochi kyukan ippan, Passim

(20) Chao Chung-fu, Ch'ing-chi tung-san-sheng chung-o chieh-wu chiao-se (Sino-Russian Negotiations over the Manchurian Border Issue, 1858-1911) (Institute of Modern History, 1970), pp. 51-136

(21) Heilungkiang chih-kao (Gazetteer of the Heilungkiang Province) (Peiping, 1932), vol. 8, pp. 11-14

These Bannermen received subsidies for transportation and living costs to enable them to move; the Chinese settlers by contrast were financially on their own as far as the long journey to distant Kirin or Heilungkiang was concerned. Moreover, once the two groups were in the frontier area, Bannermen still received the best land and the best terms; the Chinese were in most cases left with second best.(22)

Once again the Chinese migrants confounded the court's intention of favoring the Bannermen. Bannermen proved unable to work the northern lands successfully and in the end Chinese came to control and work the land in the name of the Bannermen. By 1890, the Kirin and Heilungkiang newly opened land cultivated by Chinese reached 12,700,000 *mou.*(23) If Banner lands are added to this, the figure would be even higher.

But even the new measures of encouraging settlement on the Manchurian frontier proved insufficient. The series of setbacks suffered by China as a result of the international rivalries of the 1890's and the first decade of the twentieth century forced the court to realize that simply making land available to farmers was not enough; a more dynamic policy was required. In 1894 the Sino-Japanese War broke out and in the ensuing peace the long-standing Chinese interest in Koren had to be abandoned, thus threatening Manchuria's southeastern flank. During the Boxer Uprising of 1900 Russia deployed troops in Manchuria and very nearly brought the entire territory under her sway. Finally, much of Manchuria was devastated in the course of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 when Russians and Japanese fought across the territory and laid waste much of the land.

At the same time, imperialist rivalries brought the advantage of improved transportation facilities to Manchuria: two new railroads were built-the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) and the Southern Manchurian Railway (SMR), Dairen was opened as an international port, and finally, the construction of the Peking-Mukden Railroad connected Manchuria with North China. Chinese immigrants were now able to proceed by rail from Newchwang, Dairen, Shanhaikuan, or Antung to the newly opened lands in northern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. In the same way, the agricultural products of the frontier could be returned by railway to Sui-fen, Manchouli, Dairen, and Newchwang, to reach an ever-

(22) Ibid., pp. 14-17; Kirin tung-chih, vol. 3b
(23) Sources: Kirin tung-chih, vol. 31a; Heilungkiang chih-kao, vol. 8, Passim

widening market. The combined flood of immigration and threat of foreign take-over caused a reassessment of the situation. Between 1901 and 1911, innovative new policies were developed for Manchuria. Their eventual result was to be to decide once and for all the question of who would develop Manchuria-and as a result of Ch'ing policies that decision went with the Chinese.

II. CHANGES IN CH'ING GOVERNMENT POLICY, 1900-1911

The period 1900-1911 witnessed the high tide of Chinese migration into Manchuria; simultaneously this was accompanied by far-reaching changes in Ch'ing government policy towards Manchuria and its new immigants. Before 1890 the official policy had been one of preserving the Manchu homeland for Manchu economic and cultural domination, but the prohibition had been accompanied by a purposeful laxity which had permitted Chinese illegal immigration and landholding and had even awarded government lands to Chinese all through the period of restriction. After 1900 government policy shifted to active promotion and support of Chinese immigration into Manchuria. The figures in the following table reflect this.

Table Two

Popuation and Landholding in Manchuria during the Late Ch'ing (24)

Date	*Population* (Chinese and Manchu)	*Land Under Cultivation* (Chinese and Manchu)
1890	9,000,000	Figure not available
1907	14,500,000	100,000,000 (*mou*)
1911	19,342,000	133,472,000

Ch'ing Administrative Improvements Affecting Manchuria

The most important step taken by the Ch'ing government at this juncture was to establish in 1907 the three provinces of Fengt'ien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang in Manchuria. The civil provincial govenment administration which came to Manchuria with this reform was not confined to top echelons of administration but reached down to the grass roots level as well. There was even a new office established in charge of the Chinese immigrants and agricultural development.

(24) Sources: for 1890, see Wu hsi-yung, op. cit.; for 1907 and 1911, see Manshu juyo keizai tokeihyo (Statistical Tables of Major Economic Factors in Manchuria) (Dairen, 1920), pp. 1-2, 13-14

The immigrants now for the first time enjoyed the solicitude of government offices specially set up to look out for their interests.(25) In addition, new laws and administrative regulations were enacted to ensure standard operational procedures and smooth running of the new administrative apparatus.

Govenment sponsored railroad building at the end of the Ch'ing also aided Chinese migration into Manchuria. After the Sino-Japanese War, China adopted a Policy of alliance with Russia. In 1896 an agreement was signed by the two governments to embark upon the construction of the CER. This was followed in 1898 with an agreement which gave the Russians the right to build the Southern Manchurian branch. In the autumn of 1897 work was begun on the CER; both it and its sub-section, the SMR, were completed in 1903, with a length of more than 2600 kilometers. Much of the areas reached by these lines were undeveloped but promising agricultural territory. Before 1903 it was difficult for migrants to reach Kirin and Heilungkiang because of inadequate transportation, but once the railroads were completed, not only was there the convenience of a main passenger transportation artery, but also the railroad could serve as an excellent supply route. In about the same time the Peking-Fengtien Railway was also completed. This railroad offered the North Chinese migrants the convenience of transportation directly from North China into Eastern Mongolia and Northern Manchuria.(26)

Late Ch'ing Land Policy and Agricultural Development

Before 1890 the rules and procedures for the development of unused land in Manchuria were not fixed. In most cases at varying intervals the government would survey the acreage of land cultivated by Chinese squatters and begin to assess it for tax purposes, at the same time setting up new prefectures and districts to be in charge of the territories thus newly opened. Sometimes land offices were set up to perform the land registration function.

The rate and amount of taxation varied. The newly opened land was usually placed under the policy of "assessing in the fifth year and taxing with the sixth", but due to variation in the quality of the land and other factors the point at which taxes had to begin to be paid was sometimes postponed.(27) In

(25) Chao Chung-fu, "Ch'ing-mo tung-san-sheng kai-chih te pei-chin" (Manchuria: the Frontier Government and its Reorganization), *Bulletin of the IMH*, vol. 5, pp. 313-335

(26) Tung-pei nien-chien (Manchuria Year Book, 1931) (Mukden, 1931), pp. 383-388

(27) HLK chih-kao, vol. 9, pp. 1-2; Kirin tung-chih, vol. 31a, b

1907 Manchuria was officially proclaimed as consisting of three provinces; this inevitably spurred policy towards migration and land development.

In 1908, upon the suggestion of the Governor-General of Manchuria, the Ch'ing court approved the" Regulattion for the Opening of Unused Land by Agricultural Settlers in the Border Region of Heilungkiang province", the major features of which were as follows:

1) An office was to be set up in the capital of Heilungkiang with branch offices in cities of other provinces to handle the publicity, registration of migrants, and their transporation to the newly developed areas. Announcements were distributed, registration procedures were set up with attention to recruiting the desirable type of immigrants, and arrangements were made for free transportation for the adult migrants and half the cost for dependents.
2) Each immigrant household could receive 450 *mou* of land upon payment of a registration fee of four *ch'ien* of silver (a very low fee), with the possibility of acquiring further land after the original plot was fully under cultivation. If a larger group of persons wished to form an association they were permitted to acquire a "corporate lot" (*ta-tuan* 大段). This policy was in part designed to encourage the establishment of modern large-scale commercial farming, the implementation of which would have to be, of course, based on agricultural mechanization.
3) Taxation would begin from the start of the third year of cultivation, at which time it was required that 2/3 of the original allotment be under actual cultivation. Failure to comply could result in confiscation of all or part of the land.
4) Emergency loans for immigrants would be made by the provincial bank and its branches.
5) Land allotments could be subleased to tenant farmers, with appropriate incentives for individuals who thus brought more than 10,000 *mou* of taxable land under cultivation and associations which brought more than 1 million *mou* of taxable land under cultivation.
6) Officials who were able to induce a larger scale of migration and settlement were to be duly rewarded whereas those who were remiss in such duties could be demoted or dismissed.[28]

(28) Tung-san-sheng cheng-lueh (An Administrative Record of Manchuria), *Finance*, HLK prov., pp. 25-26

Although this regulation applied exclusively to Heilungkiang it nevertheless later served as a blueprint for similar policies. Compared to the 1841 "Log Cabin" or "Pre-emption" Act of the United States, the regulation for Manchuria provided more incentives for the settlers. The Heilungkiang Settlement Regulation involved a smaller amount of land than the "Log Cabin" Act, yet it was sufficient to support the average family of six. Moreover, the Heilungkiang regulation required only small registration fee, whereas the "Log Cabin" Act required purchase after a certain number of years at $1. 25 per acre. Finally the Chinese settlers had rights to emergency loans not provided under the American plan. (29)

Some differences also existed between the regulation described above and the "Settlement Law for the Amur Region" promulgated in 1861 by the Russian government. The latter permitted each immigrant more land, 1, 750 *mou* or 270 acres, but a fee of 350 *rubles* had to be paid in advance. The Russian settlers were exempted from the corvee for ten years and from the land tax for twenty years, but no additional benefits were made available. (30) Thus the Ch'ing policies in Heilungkiang lacked the individualism of the American settlement plan and the larger parcels of land involved in the Russian. The Ch'ing policies also differed in that they gave a larger role to the government bureaucracy.

The Heilungkiang Regulation was indeed not without certain shortcomings. For one thing, the interval between the time when the 450 *mou* of land was allotted to each household and when the first taxes had to be paid was too short. The average yeild of grain per *mou* of land in Manchuria was about half a *shih*, (31) but to expect a plot of land to produce enough for consumption as well as to pay taxes within three years was unrealistic. Second, the quantity of land allotted varied with preference for the best land falling to privileged groups and associations which dominated larger parcels of land. This in turn promoted the consolidation of larger landoldings in later times. Third and last, the Positive incentives for officials who induced larger scale migration and demotion or dismissal of those who failed to do so encouraged them to falsify reports, prompted collusion between officials and landholders, and led to other irregularities. (32)

---

(29) Richard N. Current et. al., American History (New York, 1961), pp. 264-268
(30) Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904 (New York, 1958), p. 9
(31) See Heilungkiang chih-kao,, vol. 16, pp. 19-20, Passim
(32) Chao Chung-fu, Tung-shn-saeng i-min wen-ti, op. cit.

In 1908 the provincial government of Heilungkiang sponsored the policy of fostering agricultural settlements for retired military personnel and the "resident-soldier-farmer system" (*Yu-ping yu-nung* 寓兵於農), but were unsuccessful.[33]

During the decade 1901 to 1911 the Fengt'ien provincial government undertook sixteen surveys which resulted in land allotments. These opend up 24 million *mou* Eastern Mongolian Banner region. During the same period, Kirin and Heilungkiang carried out identical policies. According to the Heilungkiang provincial Gazeteer, from 1904 to 1911 more than 66 million *mou* of new land were brought under cultivation.[34] That these figures are exaggerated is clear from another source which claims that in 1915 the total land area under cultivation in Manchuria amounted to only 166,432,000 *mou*.[36] Nevertheless, the figures indicate great advances in the amount of land under cultivation in the first decade of the twentieth century. The following table tells part of the story.

Table Three

Land Settlement in Manchuria[35]

Land Area	*Time Period*	*Type of Settlement*
I-t'ung River Basin	1791-1884	Chinese squatting, illegal
Upper Liao Valley	1806-1910	Chinese squatting, later registration
T'ao-erh R. Basin	1891-1908	Settlers recruited for uncultivated land
Yalu R. North Bank	1847-1876	Private, illegal settlements later registered
T'u-men R. North Bank	1881	same
Hurka R. Basin	1670-1890	Banner settlement, Chinese labor
Kirin (not the whole area)	1726-1890	Private settlement with later registration, recruitment of Chinese as hired labor
Upper and Midde Sungari Basin	1882-1907	Banner colonies; private settlement with later registration.
Muren River Basin	1899-1909	Offices established for officially recruited immigrants
Ussuri River Valley	1875-1910	Private settlement, official recruitment of Chinese settlers
Hu-lan River Basin	1737-1896	Banner colonies with Chinese hired labor; recruitment of settlers
Heilungkiang (not the whole area)	1896-1910	Recruitment of Chinese as settlers; Banner colonies
Nonni River Basin	1860-1910	Banner colonies; recruitment of Chinese as settlers
Amur River Upper Basin	1907-1910	Agricultural settlement with recruitment

(33) HLK chih-kao, vol. 8, pp. 34-56
(34) Ibid., pp. 33-61
(35) Chu hui-fang et. al., Tung-pei ken-chih shih (History of Agricultural Settlement in Manchuria) (Chang-Chun, 1947), pp. 26-43
(36) Kungtu C. Sun, op. cit., Table 5, p. 27

Agricultural Improvements in the Late Ch'ing

The immigrants were responsible for most of the agricultural production of Manchuria, having brought with them their experiences and skills. After 1900 immigrants poured into Northern Manchuria, agriculture expand extensively throughout the entire region. The responsibility for the future development of agriculture and concomitant improvements in organization and technology now resided in government authority.

The whole basis of traditional Chinese conception of agriculture is that the land support the people and the people support the government, the two processes complementing one another. This is also readily perceptible from the traditional tax structure. After the Western incursion in China from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, the philosophical conception of the role of agriculture began to change as the government came to appreciate the significance of other factors as sources of income. Nevertheless, agriculture always played the predominant role.

Manchuria in terms of agriculture is potentially the richest part of China. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, Chao Erh-hsun was appointed military governor of Fengti'en. During his tenure of office (1905 to 1907) his major task was to promote the agriculture, industry, and commerce of the whole region. He set up the Bureau of Agriculture and Industry for this purpose, and sent people to go to Japan to study industrial technology, to the United for copying modern farming methods, and to Dairen and Shanghai to seek information on the market situation. Judging by sheer necessity Chao Erh-hsun came to the conclusion that top priority should be placed on agriculture. For that purpose an experimental farm, an agricultural school, and an Exhibition Hall were also set up in Fengt'ien. In addition he sponsored the foundation of a "Farmer's League" (*Nung-hui* 農會). Despite the short tenure of his term, Chao Erh-hsun was perhaps the first provincial level official to recognize the need for sound institutional organization, technological advancement, and overall integrated policy to lay the foundation for further agricultural modernization. [37]

In 1907 Hsu Shih-ch'ang was appointed the first Governor-General for the three provinces of Manchuria. In general he followed policies of Chao Erh-hsun. At that time the three provinces of Manchuria enjoyed a relatively

---

(37) Man-chou shih-yeh-an (Collected Documents Relating to the Agricultural and Industrial Affairs of Manchuria) (place and date unknown), pp. 1-8

autonomous status in terms of budget, which permitted the region to sponsor a greater degree of progress in agricultural contribution and technology than was the case in most of China Proper. The agricultural school was enlarged, for instance, and forestry schools were established in both Fengt'ien and Kirin provinces where experimental forest areas were set out. (38) But perhaps the most important of all these was the field work of the survey teams sent elsewhere in South Manchuria to collect information on such items as agricultural population, acreage under cultivation, land tenure, farm income, taxation, type of crops and their yield per acre, farming techniques, the market system, and questions related to technology. These research teams were under supervision of agricultural advisers from the United States with assistance of agricultural school graduates. (39)

Agricultural mechanization was another facet of progress planned in Manchuria, but it was not successful as one may expect. For lacking of capital that the government would only encourage private efforts in place of well-planned large scale government ventures. These private entrepreneurs were expected to, and some of them did, set up farm companies with new equipment, the latest techniques, and modern management. of all the sixteen farm companies, only the *Hsin-tung Ken-wu Kung-ssu* (Hsin-tung Farm Company) had any amount of success, which was managed by a Cantonese returned from the United States. The other companies turned out to be nothing more than land speculation agents. (40)

III. CONCLUSON

The development of Manchurian agriculture in the late Ch'ing under the leadership of the government only achieved success in terms of population, immigration, and new land brought under cultivation, but it failed significantly in the matter of bring new capital, new technology, or modern management methods to bear on the three provinces' agricultural situation. Nevertheless, the enlarged population and increased farmed acreage constituted the foundation on which Manchuria was later modernized in industrial terms.

(38) Tung-san-sheng cheng-lueh, *Agriculture and Commerce*, Fengt'ien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang, pp. 2-4
(39) Ibid.
(40) Ibid., Fengt'ien Province, pp. 41-44

Thus the late Ch'ing policy towards Manchuria did not differ much from that of the early and middle Ch'ing. All through the Ch'ing waves of migrants streamed continuously into Manchuria, although their numbers inceased enormously with the active government promotional efforts of the late Ch'ing. The real difference between early and late Ch'ing policies came in the late Ch'ing attempts to provide the basis for new agricultural technology. Yet by the fall of the Ch'ing, crop rotation was still the main technological basis for improving yield--a method which had been in use for centuries; and the population pressure was to be counted because of the fact, in the long run, that there would be no more virgin land to be opened.[41] And the food supply, raised by traditional methods, would be outstripped by the population increase. The piecemeal attention to Manchuria's problems provided by the late Ch'ing government precluded an overall grand design for the development of the area. The attitude towards Manchuria reflected the attitude behind other late Ch'ing reforms: too little, and too late.

(41) T. Hoshino, Economic History of Manchuria (Seoul, 1920), pp. 134-135


1. Land cultivated before 1860
2. Land cultivated after 1860
3. Land cultivated after 1890
4. Land first cultivated about 1907



Manchuria in the Late Ching